1.
What is the subgame perfect equilibrium or equilibria of Game 1 shown in the pdf document?
A
(A;a)
B
(A;b)
C
(B;b)
2.
What is the expected outcome of Game 1 shown in the pdf document?
A
A,a
B
B
C
B,a
3.
What are the payoffs to the two players in Game 1 on the pdf document?
A
1,-1
B
2,0
C
3,-5
4.
What is the subgame perfect equilibrium or equilibria of Game 2 shown in the pdf document?
A
(A,D; b)
B
(A,b,D)
C
(A;a,a) and (A;b,a)
5.
What is the expected outcome of Game 2 shown in the pdf document?
A
B
B
A,b,D
C
A,b,C
6.
What are the payoffs to the two players in Game 2 on the pdf document?
A
2,0
B
4, 5
C
3,-5
7.
Let E = 0.5, L > 1, and C = 0.25
What is the expected outcome of the game?
A
Citizen uses voice, Government responds
B
Citizen exits
C
Citizen uses voice, Government ignores
8.
Let E = 0.5, L > 1, and C = 0.25. What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player?
A
(0.75; L)
B
(-0.25; 1+L)
C
(0; 1+L)
9.
Now let E = 0.5, let L > 1,C = 0.75; What is the subgame perfect equilibrium?
A
(Exit, Exit; Respond)
B
(Voice, Exit; Loyalty)
C
(Loyalty, Exit; Respond)
10.
E = 0.5, L > 1, and C = 0.75; What is the expected outcome of this game?
A
Citizen uses voice, Government responds
B
Citizen exits
C
Citizen remains loyal
11.
E = 0.5, L > 1, and C = 0.75; What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player?
A
(-0.5; 1+L)
B
(0.5; 1)
C
(0.25; 1)
12.
What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Citizen exit threat (E>0), Gov (L>1)? Assume that E<1-c
A
(Don't Exploit, Respond; Voice, Exit)
B
(Exploit, Ignore; Loyalty, Exit)
C
(Exploit, Respond; Voice, Exit)
13.
From the last question, what is the expected outcome? Exit threat (E > 0) and the government is dependent (L > 1)
Assume E < 1 - c
A
The government does not exploit.
B
The government exploits and the citizen exits
C
The government exploits and the citizen remains loyal.
14.
One of the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game is that it can be difficult to figure out who has power and who does not simply by observing their actions in the real world.
